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persuasive evidence of the current law.
The United States does not agree with
every provision in the manual, nor does
any other state. Still, it is a fundamental
source document that must be considered in any discussion of the law of naval
warfare. As such, it is inexcusable of
Detter not to cite it. Failing to do so detracts greatly from the text. Using the
manual would have provided balance,
and familiarity with it should have
helped to avoid the errors described.
In Leslie Green’s review of Detter’s first
edition, he concluded that “regrettably,
it can hardly be said that Dr. Detter De
Lupis’ Law of War provides the reader
with any real practical account of ‘the
body of rules which regulates relationships in war.’ ” Levie, after devastatingly
recounting the representative errors and
inaccuracies in the first edition, left to
the reader to judge “whether [these errors] are important or unimportant,
could a political leader or a military
commander accept and rely on advice
based upon this volume as authority?”
Unfortunately, the passage of more than
ten years and the addition of new information do not warrant improving these
two assessments of Detter’s The Law of
War. Like the first edition, the second is
not a very useful book if one is looking
for a basic understanding of the law of
war, nor is it helpful in advancing the
development of that law.
GREG O’BRIEN

Commander, JAGC, USN
Naval War College
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This comprehensive encyclopedia of all
Russian (and Soviet) nuclear weapons
systems deserves attention not only because all earlier versions were confiscated by the Russian Security Service
(FSB) but because it is a complete and
authoritative chronology of the weapons, warheads, and delivery systems that
enabled the Soviet Union to achieve “superpower” status. Authored by Russian
physicists and mathematicians using
only unclassified data bases, the book
tells the “official” story of how Soviet
and Russian bureaucracies built the
world’s most fearsome nuclear arsenal
from World War II until the mid-1990s.
Organized by function and military services, the story is easy to follow for a
reader reasonably conversant with the
systems and willing to plow through
tables and specifications. The book’s objective, clinical, and dispassionate treatment is both its strongest and weakest
point. It presents all the facts. The data
presented in the tables and notes probably could not have been fabricated at this
level of detail. However, the book makes
no judgments or any effort to place its
contents in political context.
The chapter on the Soviet navy details
how technology shaped strategy. The development of the R-29 sea-launched ballistic missile (Nato’s SS-N-8) and the
Project 667B (Nato’s Delta I) submarine
put the Soviet ballistic submarine force
within range of its American targets
while remaining in the “bastions” of
the ice-covered regions of the Arctic,
thus obviating the need for the “Yankee
patrols” (by Yankee-type submarines
carrying SS-N-6 missiles). With only
one-third of the range of the SS-N-8,
the SS-N-6 missile was a threat only
when it was brought near the U.S. coast,
where the submarine could be constantly
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targeted by antisubmarine warfare
forces. American naval strategists of this
era can take satisfaction in having correctly postulated that the central purpose
of the entire Soviet navy was to support
the submerged missile forces, particularly the Deltas and their successors near
the Soviet coasts.
The authors dispassionately and authoritatively document the eventual decay of
the Soviet land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear edifice. Perhaps this is why
the FSB has declared the book a work of
espionage. In fact, one of its authors,
Igor Sutyagin, was arrested and held on
charges related to his research for the
book. Yet it is cold comfort even for an
American reader to note the degeneration of the Russian early-warning satellite system or the pollution hazard
caused by the way in which the nuclear
submarine fleet was deactivated.
The table on nuclear testing provides a
keen insight into the mindset of the Soviet decision-making elite, as well as the
efficacy of focused, centralized planning.
The sheer size of the program and its
reckless disregard for the environment
persuasively show the political power of
the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex.
The hundred pages devoted to this program make clear its importance. Of particular note, the Soviets conducted 135
nuclear explosions for industrial or
other “peaceful” purposes. In fact, the
Lazurit explosion of 1974 moved enough
earth to form a dam.
The authors offer no apologies for the
huge building programs or for the Soviet
Union’s unabashed desire to prevail in
the Cold War arms race. While the book
is not overtly political, one senses that
the authors believe the governmental
pronouncements justifying the building
or destruction of each weapon. They
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make numerous allusions to the Soviet
desire to adhere to international agreements, and to American perfidy as forcing
the Soviets to build all of this weaponry.
There is sadness in the discussion of the
demise of the Russian strategic program,
brought about by the dire economic situation facing Russia and the loss of Soviet republics as newly independent
states, and with them the Soviet test
ranges.
Nonetheless, this book should not be
read for its political message. It is a well
referenced storehouse of knowledge on
Soviet strategic systems, useful to researchers and historians alike. Against its
own standards, it is a remarkable
accomplishment.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to
Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Quarterly, 1999.
264pp. $28.95

Mark Lowenthal’s professed intent in
writing this book was to fulfill the need
for an introductory text for students of
intelligence. He is well qualified to do so,
having devoted more than twenty years
in the executive and legislative branches
of government as an intelligence official
and as an adjunct professor in graduate
programs at Columbia and George
Washington Universities. (He is now the
vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council for Evaluation.) The resulting work is much more than an
introductory textbook; it is a trove of
valuable information and insights ranging from the basic concepts and definitions of intelligence to a thorough
examination of the intelligence process.
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